

EG-MA 13501/1

19 October 1954

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

The Iron Guard

1. As a political movement with an ideological basis (radical nationalism; anti-semitism and rejection of the democratic government form in favor of the individual's total submission to the state) the Iron Guard experienced its climax in 1937 when it emerged from the elections (December 1937) as the third-strongest party of Rumania.
2. The Iron Guard owes its coming into existence and growth to the fact that social and political conditions in Rumania produced at that time an increasingly great gap between the people and the leading social-political class of the country. Luckily enough, this process did not lead to the radical left due to the fact that the Rumanian peasantry was individualistic, the working class too small, and the Rumanian intelligentsia nationally-minded out of tradition. Their dissatisfaction led them, therefore, all the more to the right. Unfortunately, the mass of the people could not be won for political programs since they had lost confidence in such programs through disappointments experienced with the democratic parties. On the other hand, the people were particularly susceptible to demagogic slogans, and the Iron Guard knew how to exploit this fact. This they did to excess and the Iron Guard later became a victim of its own demagogy. Even at the time when the Iron Guard was able to operate legally it had a conspirative character. From 1938 to 1940, while in the underground, the Iron Guard became a purely conspirative terrorist organization, particularly under the leadership of Horia SIMA. When in 1940 ANTONESCU admitted the Iron Guard to the government, the Iron Guard's absolute political emptiness became apparent and it also became obvious that the Iron Guard was unable to adjust from conspiracy to governing. Conspiracies against ANTONESCU were started which led to the senseless rebellion in January 1941, and in effect to the Iron Guard's own doom. Horia SIMA and his collaborators escaped to Germany where they continued to conspire against ANTONESCU with the support of SD and NSDAP-circles. However even then several of the legionaries in Germany (e.g. Constantin PAPANAGE and Ilie GABRIATA) began to criticize SIMA's leadership, and the latter then directed his terrorist methods against his own partisans. These methods were cruel to a degree that even the Gestapo labeled them as exorbitant and had to interfere. All of these activities impaired German-Rumanian relations to an extent that HITLER in early 1943 felt compelled to order the internment of Iron Guardists who had fled to Germany. SIMA and other Iron Guardists then fled from Germany to Italy to continue action against ANTONESCU from there, with the support of the Fascist party. The Italians, however, turned them back to Germany and they were all interned. Thus the split of the

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

RID/DOF Pl. note source change

62-300-1

00-300-35

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2002 2006

Iron Guard, which officially occurred as late as 1954, had its seeds in the events which took place during the war in Germany.

3. Following the Rumanian capitulation on 23 August 1944 the legionaries in Germany were set free and, with the support of the SD, SINA formed a Rumanian government-in-exile in Vienna. From here, at the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945, Horia SINA sent the secretary general of the Iron Guard, Nicolae PATRASCU, to Rumania with a group of parachutists with the ostensible purpose of organizing resistance against the Bolsheviks. In Rumania however PATRASCU established contact with the Communist Minister of Interior, Teohari GEORGESCU, in 1945, and agreed with him on Iron Guardist cooperation with the government in return for amnesty for Iron Guardists in Rumania. For example, in 1946 the legionaries participated in propaganda against the democratic parties in Rumania and in behalf of the Communist government although not overtly as the Iron Guard. The Iron Guardists have explained this action as being their sole possibility of rescuing from the Communists those Iron Guardists imprisoned in Rumania at that time. However from 1946 to 1948 it was strikingly noticeable that those resistance groups which were arrested in Rumania were doomed only after SINA affiliates had penetrated the leadership of these resistance groups. It also became known - almost all refugees reported this - that many followers of Horia SINA held posts in the Rumanian secret police, the militia, and similar security organs. Proofs for the above are furnished by newspaper reports on the trials of these resistance groups which show that legionaries who had joined these resistance groups acted as prosecution witnesses during the trials. For example, when the brother of Dr. Ion IULIAN and his group were arrested for espionage, they were betrayed by the two legionaire couriers who were maintaining contact between the group and Dr. IULIAN in Linz, Austria. Also the group of Engineer Constantin BUJOIU was arrested in 1948 after Major IULIUS TULBURE became a member of the group's leadership. TULBURE was the man who supervised the training of agent groups who were sent to Rumania by the Germans in conjunction with the SINA government in Vienna. After the war TULBURE volunteered for repatriation to Rumania, and was first heard of again when he appeared at the trial of BUJOIU. Later, in 1949-1950, Andrei NICOLA claimed that Major TULBURE was then heading an intelligence office under LVD supervision in Wiener Neustadt (or Baden near Wien) dealing with counter-intelligence activities in the Rumanian sector. This allegation was supported at that time by Peter CONSTANTINESCU and Nicolai MANTAREANU who was a member of the Rumanian Secret Service prior to the war. Both claimed that in addition to TULBURE another former member of the Iron Guard worked in this LVD office. This man was a former captain of the Rumanian General Staff and participated in preparations for the Iron Guard rebellion in 1941. They claim that even prior to the war this captain was a Soviet agent in the Rumanian General Staff. (The name of this captain will be obtained from CONSTANTINESCU and submitted later.)

SECRET

4. All this led to the opinion among Rumanian exiles, which still prevails today, that the legionaries are directed by the Communists. However the Iron Guard has utilized the espionage trials in Rumania to claim that the sole resistance in Rumania is offered by the Iron Guard. The Iron Guard has also, in order to gain a monopoly on contacts into Rumania, not deterred from publicly announcing such Rumanians who had intelligence contacts in Rumania outside of the Iron Guard. For example, the Iron Guard had an article published in the Paris newspaper l'Express revealing that Peter CONSTANTINESCU was involved in intelligence work against Rumania. Also, the legionaries spread the true report that Vasile DUKITRESCU and NICOLA had sent a man into Rumania for the TIB. They even disclosed the man's name so that utilization of this man in Rumania became impossible. Furthermore, following the war, the legionaries established contacts with Western intelligence services, particularly the CIG. They utilized these contacts primarily to discredit their political enemies. For example, in 1947 when Vasile DUKITRESCU was preparing to publish a Rumanian newspaper in Germany he was denounced to the CIG as a Soviet agent by the Iron Guard member NICOLAIU. The Iron Guard also succeeded in gaining considerable influence with the TIB in Salzburg. This they did through a former SD member, frn KAUER, who headed the TIB Rumanian section in Salzburg and who had affiliated himself with the Iron Guard in the early part of the war when he was in Rumania on duty with the SD. In this way they influenced which Rumanian emigrants were used by TIB.
5. After the disbandment of the TIB and at the latest in 1952 the Iron Guard got into contact with a Franco-American intelligence office in Paris and thus was able to send new agents into Rumania. However this new group was arrested by the Communists in late 1953. SIMA again utilized their trial in Bucharest to prove that the sole resistance in Rumania was by the Iron Guard. However this claim was not accepted by the Rumanian exiles and SIMA was accused of sending people into Rumania and senselessly sacrificing them for his own interest.
6. Politically SIMA has engaged in a number of maneuvers to enhance his own position, although these have failed in the main. In 1946-1949 SIMA and Prince NICOLAE attempted to reach a working agreement. NICOLAE wanted thereby to achieve the masses' support in order to force his acceptance as a member of the royal house by ex-King MICHEL. SIMA in turn hoped thereby to become acceptable in the political society, with the Prince's help, influence and contacts. The attempt failed since each partner was only interested in using the other as a tool. Following RADESCU's resignation from the Rumanian National Committee, in 1950, SIMA attempted to achieve cooperation with Constantin VISOGIANU. For this purpose he entered into negotiations with Prof. Anton CRIMAN. Although SIMA did not obtain the two seats he wanted for the Iron Guard in the National

SECRET

Committee, some cooperation resulted from the banding of the Iron Guard and VISCIANU against RADESCU and the League of Free Rumanians. Also the unofficial representative of the group of VISCIANU in Germany, Iru GALLIN, gave support to the Iron Guard.

7. The split of the Iron Guard in early 1934 has resulted in the following situation. The Horia SIMA-Iron Guard, centered about the Rumanian Institute in Munich, is now the smallest in number. However it comprises the most efficient and intellectually talented legionaries (Dr. Constantin SASU, Grigore MANOLESCU, engineer Virgil DAVILESCU, Paul CALAN, Octavian ROSU and (Dr. Ion) PLESERIU). The anti-SIMA group consists of the majority of legionaries in exile. However, although it has well-known Iron Guardists at its head, Ilie VAREATA, Vasile VASINUSCHI and Constantin PAPANACE, these persons, with the possible exception of PAPANACE, are not men of action and do not have clear political aims. The group is presently endeavoring to gain a leading role in the Rumanian emigration by forming a federation of all Rumanian organizations, under Prince NICOLAE, called the "Central Committee". (General Ion GHEORGHE will also apparently participate in this initiative even though it can only lessen the influence of the League of Free Rumanians.) Constantin VISCIANU may attempt to further this project through his middlemen in order to damage the League's prestige with the Americans. Indicative of this is the fact that Romulus BOTLA, VISCIANU's editor-in-chief of La Nation Roumaine, was recently in Munich holding discussions with Colonel Dimitrie ALEXANDRESCU. *Publicist*
8. As for the SIMA-Iron Guard their current situation appears as follows. They are giving backing to the League of Free Rumanians, at least in their press. For example, the Evilul Romesc (Rumanian exile) in Munich writes very favorably about the political success of Mihai PARCASANU, the League's president, and warns of General GHEORGHE's and George RAUT's (Paris) intentions to sabotage the League by forming this new federation of Rumanian groups under Prince NICOLAE. However much more important are the SIMA group's foreign policy contacts. It is apparently rallying around the so-called "Fascist International" and may assume leadership of this supra-national organization. The latter is practically a consolidation of all eastern and central European circles who collaborated with National-Socialism before and during the war, and it is busily recollecting members of the former governments-in-exile in Vienna. Since the political center of this action will be in Germany, such support as the group gets through the Dusseldorf Office for Homeless Refugees in Germany, headed by Prof. Gerhard von KENDE and former SD official Walter SCHENK, should not be underestimated. However von KENDE's attempts to gain support for the SIMA group from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior have not met with much success, through opposition by Drs. ROSSMANN and KIPP and Prof. Walter HOFFMANN.

SECRET

9. The SIRA group also apparently still maintains its contact with a Franco-American intelligence office in Paris, whereas NICOLA has lost his contact with this office. This supposition is based on the fact that CONSTANTINESCU, Mircea POPA and Ion EMIILIAN claimed that in the summer of 1954 SIRA sent new agents into Rumania, and that one of the agents was a man whom NICOLA had trained for this Paris office before he lost his contact. (George COTAE, an operational agent for this Franco-American office according to his own statements, has apparently also lost his contact.)
10. The Horia SIRA group also receives funds from a Rumanian businessman in Milan, Constantin DRAGAN, about whom various stories are circulated. It is claimed that DRAGAN's large fortune is the result of business transactions with countries behind the Iron Curtain. He is said to visit Vienna repeatedly and to have been in Prague in 1953. It is claimed that DRAGAN is a very vain person and that he finances the SIRA group because the latter knows how to flatter him. The liaison man between SIRA and DRAGAN is Octavian RUSU, Rome. It is also claimed, by the Rumanian-German journalist Georg BERGL, that DRAGAN is giving funds to the "Fascist International".
11. In conclusion it can be said that despite the activity of the anti-SIRA group, the Horia SIRA group still remains the more important of the two. It is not improbable that the anti-SIRA Iron Guards may eventually reunite with SIRA. However SIRA will never succeed in placing the entire Rumanian emigration under his leadership. His entire political career clearly shows that the splitting of the Rumanian exiles has always been his intention. The reason for this attitude is unclear. He has been deemed a creation of the Soviets; however it is also claimed that SIRA works on the orders of the British intelligence service.

(3)

15-

31-7-10-166

End 5th

66-11-1354

62-300-1

3 0 6 6 4 0 0 7 1